If we are serious about protecting everyone from catastrophic environmental damage then we need to put democratic values, institutional strengthening and governance innovation into the heart of climate action.

Keynote Speech at Westminster Foundation for Democracy Environment and Democracy Conference, March 2022

The UNFCCC had had huge impacts; reducing projected 2100 temperatures from 4.4C in 1990 to 2.4C after COP 26. However, climate science is clear that this is not a safe level of risk to take to preserve human security. The climate regime is also unprepared to manage critical risks in the 2020s on delivery, trade, climate impacts and broader geopolitics. Major powers are still reacting – not shaping – the global governance needed for an orderly and rapid climate transition.

Post-COVID Climate Governance was presented at the 2021 Beijing Forum and is based on an input paper for the UN Secretary General’s a “Our Common Agenda” Report.

Europe is the major power which has invested most in driving global climate action; leading global decarbonisation at home while spending politcal capital abroad and transferring billions to developing countries. This it not surprising as EU core interests are deeply threatened by climate change and European citizens strongly mobilised to see action. Despite this European climate diplomacy is still underpowered and fragmented requiring major reforms to deliver climate safety for Europeans.

EU Scream Podcast, November 2021

COP 26 in Glasgow risks falling short of agreeing the action needed to limit climate change to safe levels. A major barrier to many G20 countries raising climate ambition is a lack of access to affordable finance. China, the US and EU are all increasing geopolitical competition over who will build the next generation of infrastructure in emerging economies. Can this rivalry drive the clean investment needed to save Glasgow? Geopolitical Rivalry at Glasgow Comment, Oct 2021

The much-criticised reduction in the UK’s aid budget is another unforced error on the Government’s part; undermining UK influence as it tries to define a credible post-Brexit global role. Crucially it threatens to derail the Prime Minister’s personal goal of a successful outcome to the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow in November. To succeed the Prime Minister must mobilise the necessary G7 funding. UK G7 Climate Finance Comment

No matter how much US president Joe Biden wanted to prioritise tackling America’s many domestic problems, China was always going to require early attention.

But he probably didn’t expect climate change to present the first test of the US-China relationship.

Biden China Doctrine and Climate, March 2021

Climate actors will need to impact decisions in unfamiliar venues and build new coalitions with actors working on health, resilience and development if climate action is going to avoid being squeezed out by immediate pressures of COVID. As the largest global concentration of climate-active organisations London has the responsibility to help lead innovative and joined-up responses to this new context. LCAW 2021 More than an Event, June 2021

Despite looking like farce, this December saw both the NATO Summit in London and the COP25 in Madrid end in tragedy for climate action. At the NATO summit, Western powers made it clear, yet again, that they do not understand how failing to tackle climate change undermines all other efforts to maintain security. At COP25 negotiations extended longer than any previous climate talks but most real decisions were pushed off until next year’s COP26. Prospects for 2020, 2019

Today the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) launched their special report on global warming of 1.5°C, showing climate risks are worse than we thought.

The report demonstrates that allowing global temperatures to rise near 2°C is not safe. Already with only 1°C of warming the world is seeing far greater risks of extreme weather events, loss of sea ice and increased sea level rise than was predicted even just five years ago. The IPCC warns that at temperatures above 1.5°C there is a significant chance of breaching significant “tipping points” in major ecosystems like coral reefs. We simply cannot afford to take this risk. The Good, the Bad and The Ugly, Oct 2018 and Euronews.

The global climate change caravan hit New York but how to interpret the outcomes of the UN Secretary-General's Climate Action Summit and the protests in the street?

The UN Climate Action Summit was the first real chance to take the temperature on the global politics of climate action since the landmark Paris Climate Accord.

Spoiler: it wasn’t hot enough.

After failure in New York, we must reshape the politics of climate change, Climate Change News, 2019

Paris made Europeans safer but not safe. The main task of international climate diplomacy has shifted from developing legal frameworks to driving greater climate ambition at “Paris Moments” in 2020 and 2025.

Paris was a European success and its citizens expect govts to make it deliver. Europe’s climate allies & potential partners expect it to lead in defining the politics of “shared leadership”.

Domestic climate action is a necessary but insufficient foundation for EU global influence. Success requires investment in broader “Team EU” diplomacy. European Parliament Presentation on EU Climate Diplomacy, 2018 plus EU Climate Diplomacy Discussion Video

Many countries are developing long-term climate road maps to 2050 and beyond. Experience from “early movers” shows that getting the best value from road maps requires a careful eye on the politics of structural reform.

As has been often said in politics, when you hit an impossible problem, make it bigger. If you want to solve the difficult politics of the low-carbon transition, then experience suggests the most productive way is to embed the debate firmly in national governance systems in a way that makes all parts of society and the economy take responsibility and ownership. Designing Long Term Climate Roadmaps, don't forget the Politics, 2018

This week in Brussels herds of policy wonks and modellers will convene to discuss the detail of what should go into the construction EU’s 2050 climate strategy. But what looks like nerdfest must not be ignored, as the outcome of this process will have huge significance for Europe.

International eyes will also be on the EU. China – the world’s largest climate polluter – is also working on its own 2050 roadmap and will be sure to benchmark its own ambition relative to – and just behind - Europe’s.

But given the importance of the Roadmap it is deeply worrying that the current approach is fundamentally flawed. The “baseline” scenario is a world where EU emits high levels of greenhouse gases but suffers no climate damage. No Place for Fantasy Futures, Encompass, 2018

Climate change is a unique challenge to global governance requiring a transformation of all economic systems in all countries in 20 years.

We need strong international cooperation (and some luck) to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. Paris built shared goals, momentum and a platform for action but shifted the big politics of climate ambition outside the UNFCCC. Climate change is now a shaper, not just a taker, of geopolitics.

Paris will not deliver itself. We have 6 years to use its political leverage to maintain a high likelihood of preserving climate security. Global Climate Governance Presentation, 2018

The UK’s “infrastructure problem” has been misdiagnosed as one of delayed infrastructure planning holding back productivity. Long term centralised decision making is seen as the solution. But rigid, central planning risks a generation of misallocated investment & depressed economic performance.

Using a “best guess” of demand is doomed to failure when future consumption patterns and technological change are predictably disruptive. Infrastructure-UK estimates cost savings of 15% from streamlining UK infrastructure processes. Far larger savings are possible from transformational shifts to smarter, integrated infrastructure systems. Faster, Smarter, Safer, Cleaner, 2016

Anyone visiting Singapore, as I did recently, quickly realizes it is exceptional. A tiny, rich, stable city-state of nearly 6 million people perched uneasily in a region of sprawling mega-countries full of poverty and instability, it also a thriving free market trading and financial center that is meticulously planned and where 80 percent of people live in public housing.

But look below the shining surface and Singapore faces essentially an existential threat. In fact, in many ways, it encapsulates the global climate crisis. However hard it works to protect itself and however capable its systems are, it cannot achieve security and prosperity without the cooperation of others beyond its borders. Singapore Climate Dilemma, June 2016

The Paris Agreement marks a break from the past. Argument over rules is largely over even though there are still important details to agree. Although it was the best deal available, the regime is far from perfect. Country commitments do not match the agreed goal of staying well below 2C, let alone the “stretch goal” of 1.5C.

The ultimate success of the Paris regime will depend on whether its “ambition mechanism” works in practice. The focus of global climate politics has shifted from agreeing rules to increasing ambition. From how to share out the global carbon budget to influencing how fast countries believe they can shift to a zero-carbon economy. Climate Action After Paris, Euractiv 2016

As negotiations over the post-Brexit settlement started in earnest in 2017, Nick Mabey gave a keynote speech at the Irish Institute for International and European Affairs in Dublin on how energy and climate cooperation could help prevent the worst crash Brexit scenarios.

The presentation was also recorded and some of the ideas are addressed in this Encompass Comment and this Irish Times article.

The Paris Agreement was stronger than expected but only limits climate risk to around 3.5C which is unmanageable.

Predictions of climate change impacts on geo-politics and security have come true but faster than expected. The Middle East refugee crisis is the most critical example.

Despite recognition of climate security risks since 2007 little has changed in policy, operations or investments. Responses are unilateral, reactive and control-based; they often worsen political tensions and state fragilities.

Climate Security After Paris, Speech, Woodrow Wilson Centre, 2016 and Climate Security After Paris, Presentation, 2016

​​As the debate over priorities for EU reform post-Brexit ramps up, misguided attempts to avoid political tensions are undermining popular and necessary action on energy and climate change.

The political debate on what the Brexit vote means for Europe has begun to consolidate. European politicians have decided the pro-Brexit vote was driven by rising inequality, distrust of political elites and fears of immigration which also exist across the EU.

This diagnosis puts European leaders under pressure. If more Europeans do not rapidly begin to feel more prosperous and secure by working together, then they will continue drifting towards politicians who offer the allure of “taking back control”. You can’t deliver a new EU by avoiding climate change, 2016

World headlines blare the news that negotiators in Paris have reached a global climate change agreement. Yet underneath the soaring rhetoric were hard politics that can tell a lot about the longevity of the deal.

As the Paris climate negotiations moved toward their final days, delegates’ focus shifted from the technical to the political. The negotiating text had been stripped of its most baroque complications, and what was left reflected core differences among countries. Navigating this phase of the talks requires an understanding of the shifting alliances among nearly 200 countries, dramatized through the fierce public battles over how to even talk about different issues. Geopolitics of the Paris End Game, Foreign Policy, 2015

The battle has already begun to define success at the Paris climate talks in December 2015. Official expectation management is live, particularly in Paris and Washington where political leaders have domestic legacies to defend.

They are right to be concerned. Paris will not give us an unambiguous victory in the fight to avoid uncontrollable climate change.

The question for those concerned with preventing catastrophic climate change is whether the imperfect deal we will get in Paris will be a deal worth having. Or, as some fear, it will end up legitimising high levels of greenhouse gas pollution & insufficient climate aid to vulnerable countries for the next 15 years. Understanding “Success” in Paris, The Fabian Society, 2015

As delegations of cities and regional authorities gear up ahead of the UN Climate Conference in December, new analysis by E3G highlights how ill prepared European cities are to deal with the growing risks from climate impacts.

“Underfunded, Underprepared, Underwater? Cities at Risk”, brings together for the first time the different pieces of knowledge on climate risks to European cities, and finds a lack of power, funding, capacity and information leave regional authorities incapable to step up to the responsibilities handed to them by their national governments.

With 78% of European citizens living in cities and 85% of the EU’s GDP being generated in these economic hubs, the importance of effective climate risk management cannot be overestimated. Underfunded, underprepared and underwater, 2015

Last Thursday’s surprise election result has forced fundamental debate and reflection in the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, as they ask themselves what went wrong with their conversation with the people of Britain and what can be done to renew it?

Similar questions have been troubling environmentalists since the 2008 financial crash, which seemed to push climate change and nature conservation into the background of political life. The 2015 election campaign compounded that feeling as environmental issues barely registered in the political debate. What kind of movement should we invest in, to re-connect us with peoples’ lives, and to enable us better to reflect their concerns and identities? Hope and Responsibility, May 2015

The outcomes of international processes in 2015 will have a material impact on the medium term security environment and short term economic, geo-political and budgetary priorities.

2015 is not the Superbowl and will not result in an “end state” climate regime which credibly limits climate risk below 2C. 2015 needs to do enough to keep the world within critical risk limits, deliver investment certainty and public confidence.

The US is successfully shaping the climate regime but is still perceived as an unreliable partner as major countries fear reversal of US climate policy. High Stakes, Speech Woodrow Wilson Centre, 2015 and High Stakes, Presentation, February 2015

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has skilfully used the Ukraine crisis to create momentum behind his idea for an EU Energy Union. But Tusk’s Energy Union vision is unbalanced. It is strong on the rights of countries to depend on the rest of Europe for emergency gas supplies in times of crisis, but weak on the responsibilities every Member State should have to limit their vulnerability to external shocks – whether political or economic.

Those European countries most dependent on Russian gas are also those with the worst energy efficiency. Channelling scarce European funds to build gas interconnectors will be a poor investment if the gas is just wasted in inefficient factories and draughty homes. EU Energy Union. Euroactiv Comment 2015

Nick Mabey, E3G CEO, gave a presentation on implementing climate change risk management systems at the European Environment Agency in Copenhagen on 11th June 2014.

The presentation outlined the recommendations of the E3G 2011 report “Degrees of Risk: Defining a Risk Management Framework for Climate Security” and analysed the gaps in current international and national decision making systems. It also gave cutting-edge examples of how countries and sectors have developed new institutions, analysis and decision support systems to help implement risk management approaches to climate change over the past few years. Degrees of Risk EEA Presentation, 2014

As the European Commission struggles to finalise their proposal for the level of European greenhouse gas (GHG) targets for 2030, the scientific basis underpinning their decisions continues to shift and the targets discussed by the Commission will fail to protect the interests of European citizens and businesses.

New research shows that climate risks are higher than previously estimated, that much of Europe is more vulnerable to these impacts, and that agreeing stronger global emission reductions over the next 10-15 years is the only way to keep below the critical climate system threshold of 2C. If Europe wants others to act boldly in 2015 it must be prepared to show it is serious when setting its own 2030 targets. Europe dithers while the door closes on a 2C future, Encompass 2014

As President Putin finalises his illegal annexation of Crimea, European leaders respond with limited travel bans and asset freezes. Everybody knows this deep disconnect between cause & consequence is caused by Europe’s entanglement with Russian fossil fuels and most crucially EU dependence on gas imports.

Europe needs to break this link. We cannot spend the next 30 years tempering our support for sovereignty, democracy, human rights and rule of law in the Eastern neighbourhood because of a fear that the lights will go out, or our populations will freeze.

European Leaders seem fear Brussels more than Putin, 2014

The low carbon transformation will involve increases in investment, rapid innovation and new markets across Europe.

Governments must balance maintaining basic service provision in energy, food, construction, etc. with putting their economies on a path to a resilient, low-carbon future. This will often require interventions from governments to reduce market risk to ensure investment certainty and provide incentives for innovative products. All of measures which require state aid clearance. A reformed State Aid framework must proactively create the conditions for rapid transformation by removing support for inefficient, polluting industries and opening markets to new disruptive business models. Commissioned by the Green European Foundation this 2013 report lays out principles for a low carbon State Aid framework.

While the headlines focused on anti- tax avoidance measures, behind the scenes at the G8 a potentially momentous project was taking shape. The G8 agreed to kick-start negotiations on a new EU-US Free Trade Agreement. An agreement we are promised will help both economies power out of the current recession. So far so good. Though tariffs on goods are generally low on both sides of the Atlantic, there are still barriers to fair trade which could be removed.

But look a little closer and this gift horse seems rather less impressive. Headlines boast of potential gains for the European economy of €70-120 billion, or €545 a year for every European household; huge benefits to hard-pressed European families. But these figures are – shall we say – slightly spun. European Recovery: More Globalised or More Green, Encompass 2013

Europe has made real progress in preparing its economy for the low-carbon transition. We have decoupled GDP growth from increases in carbon pollution, we have made our industries more efficient (though there is much more to do), and we have invested billions of euros in the fast-growing sectors that could drive our economy to a high-innovation, high-value, high-employment & low-carbon future.

The world has changed too. The global low carbon economy has moved from a mere projection to a $4 trillion (€2.9 trillion) reality, which grows at nearly 4% every year.

Yet instead of backing Europe’s successful new industries in their efforts to win the global low carbon race, European leaders are listening to the voices of fossil-fuel dependent industries claiming that they will be forced to move abroad by any ambitious European climate targets for 2030. So-called ‘carbon leakage’. Low Carbon Leakage, Politico, 2013

EU decarbonisation is teaching us many unexpected lessons about the practical economics of low carbon transformation. Learning lessons quickly will reduce the costs and increase the pace of transition.

Pace: speed of change needed is faster than the “natural” speed of markets and there is need for dynamic intervention by governments to match ecologically determined targets.

Risk: pervasive risk and uncertainty dominates policy and investment decisions and is driving structural reforms to rebalance risk between public and private players .

Multiple Benefits: energy markets have to meet multiple objectives - security, equity, industrial and regional policy - which can help or hinder decarbonisation but need more explicit policy consideration.

If done well decarbonisation should be cheap, will always be affordable, but will not be easy. EU Decarbonisation: Multiple Benefits, Multiple Risks, 2013

Europe is currently so enmeshed in a narrative of weakness and decline that it seems to have missed the real success it achieved at the Durban climate conference. To read the European press, and much of the commentary by European environmental organisations, you would think that Durban had been a complete failure, or at best an uneventful talking shop.

But Durban achieved much more than this. It is true that it did not solve the global climate change problem. But then that outcome was never on the table. Durban did achieve significant outcomes which give hope and direction for a global response to climate change.

An active and forceful Europe was at the centre of delivering the Durban outcomes. This outcome was only possible because of fifteen years of strategic investment by Europe on building a successful multilateral response to climate change. Understanding Europe’s Unexpected Success at Durban, 2012

In recent years low-carbon business has been virtually silent in the political debate over UK recovery. Even when George Osborne undermined confidence in UK climate policy in his 2011 party conference speech there was no concerted and public business response. It is impossible to imagine such silence if he had talked down any other part of the UK economy.

Why the silence? It can't be a lack of things to say. There is more evidence on the economic benefits of low-carbon investment than on any other recovery policy. It can't be that clean energy companies lack the resources to speak. The major clean energy technology companies such as GE, Seimens, ABB and Alsthom are huge global ventures. The problem seems to be structural. Guardian Comment 2012

European action on climate change is at a critical stage. The impact of the economic crisis means that though the EU will meet its headline emissions targets it is failing to provide adequate incentives for new investment.

In European economic ministries. at best climate change policy is seen as marginal to macroeconomic issues, and at worst harmful to growth. Low carbon recovery packages are identified with a Keynesian centre-left approach to demand stimulation. This does not resonate with the majority of European centre-right governments. Policy packages must be reframed to emphasise their impact on long run competition and productivity. Reframing Green Growth, 2012

Two years after Copenhagen, Europe finds itself central to shaping the direction of the global climate change regime again.

By the Durban conference in December the EU needs to decide whether – and how – it will sign-up to a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. But Europe is characteristically dithering over the choices involved, and is therefore failing to shape the global political environment around this decision.

The first Kyoto commitment period finishes in 2012 so Europe needs to make a decision on the future of Kyoto outside the context of an overarching “global deal”. Europe must move on from the strategic offers it defined in advance of Copenhagen to an approach that reflects today’s realities. Europe has to follow its Climate Realpolitik, 2011

With Europe's most visible economic project in crisis there is an understandable lack of confidence among politicians delivering on other ambitious objectives. But it is also still true that without a common purpose Europe as a political project will fail. There is another economic arena where a renewed sense of common purpose is urgently needed to preserve European prosperity and security: completing the economic architecture needed to underpin the shift to a low carbon European economy.

But while European leaders understand climate change as an environmental challenge, they have yet to fully absorb the economic reforms needed to deliver a low carbon economy. Among economic policy makers tackling climate change is still seen as either peripheral or damaging to economic growth. There is a battle in every EU member state between finance & environment ministries over the pace of low carbon action.

Europe must complete its low carbon transition, Encompass, 2011

China’s 12th 5 Year Plan represents a unique challenge to European policymakers. After decades of focusing on “catch-up” growth Beijing is pivoting to increase the quality and productivity of its economy in advance of its predicted workforce peaking in 2017. China fears becoming old before it is rich.

Central to this new industrial strategy is major investment and RD&D in green energy, transportation and infrastructure; backed up by major incentives to build advanced manufacturing.

This is a major endorsement that Europe’s climate diplomacy has set a credible direction for continued global growth in the low carbon economy; despite US resistance and reversals. However, as the world leader in low carbon technology this also presents a competitive threat to EU companies.

China 12th 5 Year Plan, IIEA Speech, 2011 and China 12th 5 Year Plan Presentation, 2011 based on analysis in Chinese Challenge or Low Carbon Opportunity?

Better ways of driving policy and political change are needed to deliver our climate and sustainable development goals

The barriers to fast enough change are not primarily economic, technical or analytical but political and institutional

We can use new approaches to accelerate and better direct change – but this is as much about innovation, design and new skills as it is about new analysis.

This presentation uses examples from E3G’s work to illustrate new approaches to drive practical systemic change.

Why “Muddling Through” Wont Do, CDKN Speech, 2011 and Why Muddling Through Wont Do, Presentation, 2011

Climate change should be treated similarly to other strategic threats like terrorism and cyber-security. It is a global problem that relies mainly on civilian action by civilian authorities to reduce security risks to manageable levels and, if left unmanaged, will have serious hard-security implications.

A more effective “whole-of-government” approach to the risk management of climate change would require the inclusion of climate change in national security processes, regular assessments of the effectiveness of climate action, and risk-managemen responsibilities well beyond environment and energy ministries. Whole of Government Climate Decision Making, Halifax Forum, 2010

The preventative security agenda is at a critical juncture. Changes in the political environment mean that there are opportunities to make a decisive step forward, but these will not be realised without a step-change concerted influencing by the advocates of preventative action. The ability to take advantage of these opportunities will require a far clearer shared understanding of what success would look like in 5-10 years and a more sophisticated analysis of barriers to systemic change than merely blaming a lack of political will for inaction.

As co-Chair of the East-West Institute’s Preventive Diplomacy Task Force, Nick Mabey gave a keynote speech on a future agenda for conflict prevention EWI Conflict Prevention Speech, 2010 and interview.

Today, the imperative of meeting global energy and climate security needs is driving a third industrial revolution. With the combined market power of the European Union, the world’s largest single market, and China, the world’s second largest and fastest growing economy, there are unprecedented cooperation opportunities for the two sides to expand new markets for low-carbon goods, services and technologies.

Linking these markets will accelerate market growth, help drive down the costs and begin to lay the standards underpinning the low carbon transition.

An Alliance worth Striving for, chinadialogue, 2010 was co-authored by Nick Mabey and Bernice Lee, Director at Chatham House based on joint research in the major report “Changing Climates”, 2007.

As immediate emotions fade, space is opening for more measured reflections on the “lessons” of Copenhagen. Nowhere is realistic assessment more important than in Europe. The last weeks have seen many commentators gleefully proclaiming the end of multilateralism, and asserting the marginalisation of European power. But these readings of Copenhagen are wrong. The real lesson is that an active EU remains central to preventing catastrophic climate change, but the EU needs to match its political strategy to the geopolitical realities which Copenhagen so starkly revealed.

Down but not Out? Reviving the EU's political strategy after Copenhagen, 2010

In the world of military intelligence much time is spent trying to distinguish “blinks” – unpremeditated random actions – from “winks” – deliberate moves designed to communicate intent and draw out a response. The climate change negotiations have now entered a phase where a team of tame “spooks” is needed by anybody trying to make sense of the myriad messages emerging from the hectic schedule of pre-Copenhagen meetings.

The APEC Summit saw confident headlines that the US and China had agreed to a Danish proposal to make the Copenhagen outcome non-legally binding. Meanwhile the real US-China Summit two days later agreed that both countries are “striving for final legal agreement” at Copenhagen, and the Chinese confirmed they are still “studying” the Danish proposal. A “Pre- COP” Ministerial meeting in Copenhagen showed a range of conflicting messages from countries. Sorting Blinks from Winks, 2009

This year was meant to be the year of climate change. Yet UN negotiations in Bonn this week towards a global climate agreement in Copenhagen (COP15) in December are stalling amid a flurry of weak commitments and recriminations. This combined with economic anxiety about pledging assistance to poorer countries is threatening to bring progress to a halt. If COP15 is to succeed, climate negotiators will have to learn lessons from the world of peacemaking and raise their game accordingly.

At present, climate negotiations are a parody of trade talks, with countries jockeying for advantage, and demanding the most from others while taking the least action possible themselves. The debate over "historical responsibility" has clouded focus and undermined the fragile trust between countries that climate change is a common problem that all must commit to solving.

Blame Games on Climate Change, Guardian, 2009

Low carbon stimulus is the most effective way to drive economic recovery

As the world faces its worst economic crisis in two generations, policymakers’ attention is focused on delivering short term economic stimulus and future financial stability. However, a sustainable economic recovery must manage the immediate crisis of weak demand as well as lay the foundations for stable growth.

A focus on driving growth in low carbon markets can help tackle both these risks. Concerted G20 investment in energy efficiency and new energy sources will reduce oil price rises and save money in every country. Spending on low carbon infrastructure leads to a stronger short term impact on demand than tax cuts, generates high levels of jobs, and will kick-start markets with strong growth potential.

Delivering a Sustainable L:ow Carbon Recovery, 2009

As financial storms rage over the Atlantic, siren voices have begun to argue that the economic crisis will derail plans to agree an ambitious global climate change deal in Copenhagen next year.

The lesson of the expensive failure to effectively regulate the global financial system, must be the absolute necessity of agreeing to limit risks to the stability of the global climate system. Bold political leadership is key and is needed not only from a new US president but also from the EU, China and India; perhaps an even more challenging prospect.

Don’t Plan on Bailing out the Climate Crisis, 2008

As the post-war situation in Iraq dominates headlines, a major diplomatic initiative led by the US to prevent global recession has been little reported. The US Treasury Secretary has been travelling the world urging countries to adopt expansionary economic policies which will raise world GDP growth, particularly in the Euro-zone and Japan where growth rates are stagnating.

Environmentalists have always disliked GDP as an indicator, for many good reasons, but what should an “environmental” response to the threat of global recession look like?

At the moment there is no coherent response, and this fuels suspicion among the general public – skilfully exploited by anti-environment politicians in all countries – that environmentalists are against prosperity and would like nothing more than to see the world economy stagnate. Green Keynesians, 2007

The economics of climate change is lagging behind the science. We need to improve on this quickly if we are to take the right investment decisions, This means that policy makers are left with little useful guidance from the economics literature on the core decision they have to make: how far and fast should we cut global emissions?

If we were to accept the need to stabilise emissions at 450ppm, this would require much faster investment in low carbon energy sources in the next 25 years. Investment would have to prevent lock-in to high carbon power infrastructure.

This would also require a far more aggressive and interventionist approach by policy makers to the research, development and deployment of new technologies over the next 5-15 years. For if these investments are not made soon, then there will be no chance of avoiding high risks of catastrophic climate change impacts. Investing in the Economics of Climate Security, 2007

It is in the nature of institutions to split the world into separate pieces, only by doing this can action be focused and outputs delivered. However, as times and situations change these policy silos become dysfunctional and prevent progress towards strategic goals.

We are now at such a juncture. There is no sensible way to construct policy inside the existing narrow categories of energy security, climate security and regional security. The interconnections between these areas are so profound that a holistic strategy is needed. No-one area deserves a priori precedence from decision makers as they all impact on fundamental security concerns.

Put another way - security is security is security. Whether considering energy supply disruption, regional instability driven by competition for resources or climate impacts on food and water competition. Beyond Zero Sum Politics, 2007

For too long the environment community has been forced into a defensive debate over whether there is a trade-off between protecting the environment and European competitiveness. 

But Europe needs to become a global leader in driving cooperative sustainable development if it is to preserve the conditions for its own future prosperity. This is not philanthropy, but a matter of core strategic interest for Europe.

Europe's continued prosperity requires leadership on sustainable development, European Environment Bureau, Keynote Speech, 2007

There is no more powerful dynamic at work in the world today than the economic transformation of China. No other country in world history has managed to achieve economic growth of 8-10% for nearly two decades. No other country has transformed itself – in just 13 years – from a major oil exporter to the world’s second largest oil importer, expected to overtake the USA by 2030. But with China’s unprecedented economic expansion comes the risk of significant climate consequences.

People have come to fear China not simply because of its growing economic might, but because of the carbon emissions that go with it.

China’s Climate Choices, ENDS, 2006

Environmental and resource issues should be at the very heart of a progressive approach to UK foreign policy. Foreign policy should rightly be concerned with issues of security and prosperity, but in an interdependent world that is pressing up against or exceeding many environmental and resource limits, a radically different approach will be required to achieve these traditional goals.

The continuation of our existing resource-intensive and polluting economic behaviour is a recipe for global ecological catastrophe. The traditional foreign policy-making establishment, in the UK and elsewhere, has been slow to wake up to this fact and the far-reaching implications that flow from it.

Sustainability and Foreign Policy, 2006 appeared in the IPPR Book “Progressive Foreign Policy”.

Prosperity has always been the foundation of political stability. Europe has many misplaced fears about its ability to maintain its prosperity, and this is resulting in a politically debilitating lack of confidence. However, without this confidence Europe will be unable to play the leadership role necessary to secure the global conditions for its future prosperity and security

All other major countries face similar structural stresses, even the US and China will have rapidly aging populations in the next 15 years. In this world the core founding insight of the EU becomes globally relevant: while companies may compete, countries are interdependent.

Europe’s history shows how crude economic nationalism leads to conflict, and Europe is ill fitted to prosper in a world of competing “great powers”. Europe in the World: Economic Narrative, 2006